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The New Paradox of Temporal Transience

David J. Buller
and
Thomas R. Foster

McTaggart1 raised a famed paradox regarding the transientist conception of time, the
idea that the present moves into the future to overtake future events (or, alternatively, that future
events move into the present) and past events recede further and further into the past as time goes
on. Schlesinger2 has recently attempted an ingenious transientist solution to McTaggart’s
paradox. We will argue that Schlesinger’s solution to McTaggart’s paradox itself gives rise to a
new, yet perfectly parallel, paradox which can only be resolved by abandoning the transientist
view of time.3
McTaggart draws a distinction between two types of temporal statement about events.
On the one hand, we speak of events as being in the past, in the present, and in the future; and,
on the other hand, we speak of events as occurring earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than
one another. The former type of statement locates events within what McTaggart calls the ‘Aseries’ and are, hence, ‘A-statements’; whereas the latter type locates events within the ‘B-series’
and are, hence, ‘B-statements’. What is characteristic of A-statements is that they undergo
changes in truth value; for example, the statement that some event is future changes truth value
when that event becomes present. But B-statements are, if true, always true and, if false, always
false. Thus, the notion that time is dynamic (the transientist view) is inextricably linked to the A-
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series. The idea, here, is that the now in the A-series moves along a sequence of events, with the
motion of the now being from the past toward the future (as in Figure 1).

Figure 1

McTaggart generates his paradox by pointing out that the predicates ‘is past’, ‘is present’,
and ‘is future’ are incompatible, since ‘x is past’ implies ‘x is neither present nor future’, ‘x is
present’ implies ‘x is neither past nor future’, and ‘x is future’ implies ‘x is neither present nor
past’. But, McTaggart argues, every event satisfies all of these predicates; that is, every event, E,
is such that E is past, E is present, and E is future. This, however, generates a contradiction,
since if E is present and E is past (and ‘E is past’ implies ‘E is neither present nor future’), it
follows that E is both present and not present.
The seemingly obvious response to McTaggart’s paradox is to claim that there is no
contradiction here, because E never satisfies all of these predicates at the same time. And there
are two ways in which one can make this move. The first is to relativize attributions of pastness,
presentness, and futurity to different times in the A-series. Thus, for some event E which is
present, one can claim that E is past in the future and that E is future in the past. This move does
succeed in attributing pastness, presentness, and futurity to E at different times, but in so doing
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introduces a set of second-level temporal predicates. So, corresponding to each first-level
predicate (‘is past’, ‘is present’, ‘is future’), there are three second-level predicates as follows:

First-level

Second-level
(1) is past in the past

is past

(2) is past in the present
(3) is past in the future
(4) is present in the past

is present

(5) is present in the present
(6) is present in the future
(7) is future in the past

is future

(8) is future in the present
(9) is future in the future

Now, although (3), (5), and (7) are compatible (and are those which were introduced above to
avoid McTaggart’s paradox), McTaggart can point out that every event satisfies every secondlevel predicate. And some of these are clearly incompatible: consider, for example, (2), (5), and
(8). Thus, this way of attempting to avoid McTaggart’s paradox merely shifts the paradox to the
second-level predicates which were introduced to resolve the paradox with respect to the firstlevel predicates. Of course, one could introduce third-level predicates (of which there are twenty
seven) in a like effort to resolve the paradox with respect to the second-level predicates. But,
McTaggart’s paradox arises with respect to these predicates as well. Hence, relativizing
attributions of pastness, presentness, and futurity to different times in the A-series can never
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succeed in eliminating the paradox; consequently, this move doesn’t constitute a genuine
resolution of McTaggart’s paradox.
The second way in which to claim that there is no genuine contradiction is to relativize
attributions of pastness, presentness, and futurity to different times in the B-series. Thus, one
can say that E is present at t4 (in Figure 1), E is past at tn (for any time tn such that n > 4), and E
is future at tm (for any time tm such that m < 4). By relativizing the satisfaction of these
predicates to particular times in the B-series, however, one avoids McTaggart’s paradox only by
transforming the original A-statements into B-statements as follows:

A-statement

Translation

B-statement

E is past

E is past at tn

is equivalent to

E is earlier than tn (n > 4)

E is present

E is present at t4

is equivalent to

E is simultaneous with t4

E is future

E is future at tm

is equivalent to

E is later than tm (m < 4)

This does succeed in avoiding the contradiction which McTaggart derives, since it claims that E
is present at t4 while E is not present at ti (for all ti such that i ≠ 4). By avoiding the contradiction
in this way, however, one pays the price of denying the reality of the A-series. For the
translations of the A-statements (being equivalent to B-statements) are always true; thus, since
they don’t undergo changes in truth value, they are not genuinely unreduced A-statements.
Although McTaggart concludes from all this that time is unreal (since he maintains that the Aseries is essential to time), some (e.g. Horwich4) have been content with this resolution of the
paradox, claiming that all McTaggart’s paradox shows is that the A-series is unreal.
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Such a resolution, however, is unsatisfactory to the transientist, who must find some other
way of responding to McTaggart’s paradox. Thus, a transientist’s solution must not only avoid
McTaggart’s contradiction, but must do so without relativizing the truth of A-statements to
particular times in the B-series.
Schlesinger attempts just such a transientist solution. Schlesinger postulates a sequence
of worlds which are identical in every respect except for the moment which is occupied by the
now, as in Figure 2, where the heavy bar indicates the position of the now in each of the worlds
Wi. Schlesinger’s idea is that we should not think of the now itself as moving along the
sequence of events located in the B-series (as in Figure 1). Rather, in this new model, it is
actuality which moves from world to world, and its motion is along the A-series in the direction
of the future. So, since the now occupies moment mn in world Wn, when actuality moves from
world Wn – 1 to world Wn, the events which occur at mn become present occurrences. Similarly,
when actuality moves from Wn to Wn – 1, the events at mn become past and the events at mn + 1
become present. On this model, what distinguishes A-statements from B-statements isn’t that
the former undergo changes in truth value, while the latter don’t; rather, A-statements are those
which are true in only some of the worlds in the model (in fact, statements attributing presentness
to an event are true in only a single world), while B-statements are true in every world in the
model.
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Figure 2
The way in which Schlesinger believes this model can resolve McTaggart’s paradox
while retaining the transientist view of time is as follows. Rather than relativizing the
contradictory ‘E is present’ and ‘E is not present’ to different times, Schlesinger claims that they
should be relativized to different worlds. Thus, rather than saying that ‘E is present’ should be
understood as ‘E is present at mn’ (referring now to Figure 2), it should be understood as ‘E is
present in Wn’. To put it another way, Schlesinger argues that we should not understand ‘E is
present’ to be true at mn, rather we should understand it to be true in Wn. This effects a different
translation of the paradoxical A-statements than that considered above. On Schlesinger’s view,
we get the following translations:
A-statement

Translation

E is past

‘E is past’ is true in Wk (for all worlds Wk such that k > n)

E is present

‘E is present’ is true in Wn

E is future

‘E is future’ is true in Wm (for all worlds Wm such that m < n)
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Thus, McTaggart’s paradox is avoided, since the statements ‘E is present’ and ‘E is not present’
are never both true in the same world.
However, a new, yet perfectly parallel, paradox arises as follows. For any world Wi in
Schlesinger’s model, by construction of the model, Wi’s being actual is incompatible with any
other world’s being actual; for to say that Wi is actual is simply to say that no world Wk, such
that k ≠ i, is actual. But, in Schlesinger’s model, every world is actual. It follows that every
world in the model is both actual and not actual.
Let us run through this argument formally, and a little more slowly, for the sake of
perspicuity. Let ‘A’ be a one-place predicate meaning ‘is actual’, and let ‘w’ (with numerical
subscripts) be a variable ranging over Schlesinger’s worlds. The premises are as follows:
(i)

(w1)(Aw1 ® ~ ($w2)[Aw2 & w1 ≠ w2])

(ii)

(w1)Aw1

If we instantiate both premises to Wn, by modus ponens we get:
(iii)

~ ($w2)[Aw2 & Wn ≠ w2]

From (iii) by quantifier exchange, instantiation to Wn + 1, and DeMorgan we get:
(iv)

~ AWn + 1 Ú Wn = Wn + 1

However, by construction of Schlesinger’s model, Wn ≠ Wn + 1. Thus, by disjunctive syllogism
we get:
(v)

~ AWn + 1

But if we instantiate (ii) to Wn + 1, conjoin it with (v), and universally generalize, we get:
(C)

(w1)(Aw1 & ~ Aw1)

i.e. every world is both actual and not actual.
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There is, of course, an obvious way for Schlesinger to avoid this contradiction. And that
is to point out that no two worlds are actual at the same moment; for Wn is actual at mn, Wn + 1 is
actual at mn + 1, and so on. Thus, to avoid the contradiction, Schlesinger need only relativize
statements about the actuality of worlds to the moments at which they are actual. Rather than
saying, for any world Wi, that Wi is actual simpliciter, Schlesinger need only say instead ‘Wi is
actual at mi’. This move does succeed in avoiding the contradiction, but in so doing transforms
statements about the actuality of worlds into B-statements, i.e. statements which relativize the
actuality of worlds to moments in the B-series.
The problem this poses for Schlesinger’s attempted transientist solution to McTaggart’s
paradox is as follows. Schlesinger wants to avoid the contradiction which McTaggart derives by
relativizing statements about the present to worlds in which they are true. Thus
(P)

‘E is present’

becomes:
(1)

‘E is present’ is true in Wn.

(N)

‘E is not present’

And

becomes:
(2)

‘E is not present’ is true in every world Wi such that i ≠ n.

But since what makes (1) true is the fact that the moment at which E occurs is now only when
Wn is actual, and since Wn’s being actual ensures that the moment at which E occurs is now, (1)
is equivalent to:
(3)

‘E is present’ is true when Wn is actual.

But to avoid the above paradox about actuality, (3) becomes:
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(4)

‘E is present’ is true when Wn is actual and Wn is actual at mn

which, with respect to Schlesinger’s model, is equivalent to:
(5)

‘E is present’ is true at mn.

And (5) is a paradigmatic B-statement.5
There is, though, a possible response to this argument, which is to claim that the move
from (3) to (4) is illegitimate.6 The rationale is that the moment mn extends through each of the
worlds in Schlesinger’s model. Thus, the moment mn occurs, for example, in Wn + 1. But Wn
isn’t actual at the occurrence of mn in Wn + 1; the only occurrence of mn at which Wn is actual is
that occurrence which is present. So, (4) could be replaced with:
(4*)

‘E is present’ is true when Wn is actual and Wn is actual when mn is present.

Again, however, with respect to Schlesinger’s model, (4*) is equivalent to:
(5*)

‘E is present’ is true when mn is present

which, in turn, is equivalent to:
(6*)

E is present when mn is present.

But this latter is equivalent to:
(7*)

E is simultaneous with mn

which, again, is a paradigmatic B-statement. Now, while it is obvious that (6*) entails (7*), it
may not be as obvious that (7*) entails (6*); so it might be thought that they are in fact not
equivalent. But to see that they are, note that (7*) entails that, no matter whether E and mn occur
in the past, present, or future, if one of them occurs in the past, present, or future, the other does
as well. Consequently, (7*) does in fact entail:
(8*)

E is past when mn is past and E is present when mn is present and E is future
when mn is future.
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And, of course, by simplification, (8*) entails (6*). Thus, (6*) is in fact equivalent to (7*).
So, Schlesinger avoids McTaggart’s paradox by relativizing statements about the present
to worlds in which they are true; but this relativization itself generates a precisely parallel
paradox, which can be resolved by relativizing the actuality of a world to a moment in the Bseries. Consequently, paradox can be avoided by indirectly relativizing statements about the
present to the moments in the B-series at which they are true. Once this move is made, however,
we no longer have unreduced A-statements, we have B-statements. Thus, Schlesinger’s model
doesn’t actually succeed in providing a transientist solution to McTaggart’s paradox.
Schlesinger could avoid this consequence, however, by arguing that the A-series in his
model is significantly different than the A-series in McTaggart’s model; so, the problem that
arises with respect to relativizing to the A-series on McTaggart’s model wouldn’t arise with
respect to relativizing to the A-series in his model. Thus, rather than relativizing the actuality of
Wn to a moment (or the presence of a moment) in the B-series (namely, mn), Schlesinger could
attempt to relativize the actuality of Wn to the A-series, a move which parallels a standard way of
attempting to avoid McTaggart’s paradox. But, in Schlesinger’s A-series, there are no positions
(as there are in McTaggart’s A-series). Consequently, if the actuality of Wn is to be relativized
to Schlesinger’s A-series, the relativization must be relational. This would proceed as follows.
There are two senses of ‘before’ in Schlesinger’s model: a B-series ‘before’ (which means
simply ‘earlier than’) and an A-series ‘before’, which is an ordering relation for the sequence of
Schlesinger’s worlds (Schlesinger 1991, pp. 432 and 439). Making use of the A-series ‘before’,
Schlesinger could point out that Wn is actual before Wn + 1 is actual. But, of course, Wn – 1 is
actual before Wn + 1 is actual as well. Thus, if the relativization to the A-series is to be effective
in assigning the actuality of Wn a unique place in the A-series, Schlesinger would have to say
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that Wn is actual right before Wn + 1 is actual, where the right before relation would be analyzed
as follows:
A world Wi is right before a world Wk in the A-series if and only if (a) Wi is before Wk in
the A-series and (b) there is no world Wm such that Wm is before Wk in the A-series and
Wi is before Wm in the A-series.7
Employing this A-series right before relation, Schlesinger could resist the move from (3) to (4*)
made above and, instead, say that the paradox of actuality which arises with respect to (3) should
be resolved by:
(4**) ‘E is present’ is true when Wn is actual and Wn is actual right before Wn + 1 is
actual.
Again, however, with respect to Schlesinger’s model, (4**) is equivalent to:
(5**) ‘E is present’ is true right before Wn + 1 is actual.
And the paradox of actuality arises again with respect to (5**), for Wn + 1 is both actual and not
actual. Schlesinger could, of course, point out that Wn + 1 is actual right before Wn + 2 is actual.
So, he could resolve the paradox with respect to (5**) by introducing:
(6**) ‘E is present’ is true right before Wn + 1 is actual and Wn + 1 is actual right before
Wn + 2 is actual.
But, of course, this merely transplants the paradox to the actuality of Wn + 2; it doesn’t resolve the
paradox.
Therefore, if Schlesinger relativizes the actuality of the worlds within his model to
particular moments in the B-series, he hasn’t succeeded in providing a transientist solution to
McTaggart’s paradox. And if he relativizes the actuality of the worlds within his model to the A-
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series, he hasn’t provided a solution to McTaggart’s paradox at all, since a new, yet perfectly
parallel, paradox appears within the purported solution which remains unresolved.8
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